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PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

7

Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev.
1033, 1033-50 (1981).
"[W]e must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall
admonished us in a statement pregnant with more
than one meaning, "that it is a constitution we are
expounding." Marshall meant that the Constitution
should be read as a document "intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to
the various crises of human affairs." But he meant
also that the construction placed upon the document
must have regard for its "great outlines" and "important objects." Limits are implied by the very nature
of the task. There is not the same freedom in
construing the Constitution as in constructing a
moral code.
The conclusion that there are limits to the meaning that may be given the Constitution is not likely to
arouse controversy. Yet, that conclusion masks an
important ambiguity concerning the source and permanence of those limits. The boundaries of permissible constitutional interpretation, it might be argued,
are set by the intentions of those who drafted and
ratified the original document and the several
amendments to it. Accommodation to change
through interpretation is not wholly foreclosed on
this view, for the Constitution often speaks in
generalities, but (proponents of this view maintain)
present judgment is securely bounded by the intentions of "the framers." The opposing view is less
easily stated. At the risk of initial oversimplification,
the boundaries of permissible constitutional interpretation are, on that view, subject to continuous
adjustment. The meaning of the Constitution is
never fixed; rather, it changes over time to accommodate altered circumstances and evolving values. Only
the former view, it seems apparent, is compatible
with the recurrent claim that the Constitution itself
stipulates the values that must be employed in
making decisions. The latter view recognizes limits
to the interpretation that may properly be placed
upon the Constitution, but it does not treat those
limits as embedded in the Constitution. It regards
c~mstitutional law not as an expression of values
written into the Constitution by the framers, but as
the product of a continuing process of valuation
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carried on by those to whom the task of constitutional interpretation has been entrusted.

I
The notion that constitutional interpretation consists of determining the intentions of the framers
occupies an important place in the history of thought
about the Constitution. Many persons, including
some of the most distinguished members of the
Supreme Court, have urged that precisely because it
is a constitution we are expounding, there is a duty of
fidelity to the intentions of those who drafted and
ratified the document. Thus, Chief Justice Taney, in
deciding "whether a person of the African race can be
a citizen of the United States," wrote:
No one, we presume, supposes that any
change in public opinion or feeling . . . should
induce the Court to give to the words of the
Constitution a more liberal construction in
their favor than they were intended to bear
when the instrument was framed and adopted.
Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret
it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust,
there is a mode prescribed in the instrument
itself by which it may be amended; but while it
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as
it was understood at the time of its adoption. It
is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning . . . .
A century later, Mr. Justice Black developed a
similar theme and purported to make it a cornerstone
of his constitutional philosophy. Rejecting a claim
that the death penalty should be held to violate the
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," he wrote:
In my view, thes~ words cannot be read to
outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law
here and in the countries from which our
ancestors came at the time the Amendment
was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the
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framers intended to end capital punishment by
the Amendment.
Views such as those expressed by Taney and
Black may at times have influenced constitutional
decision, but it is beyond doubt that they do not
reflect the course of American constitutional development. Constitutional decision-making has not
been confined to a process of discovering the specific
intentions of the framers. There are various reasons
why this is so, but the most pervasive is that the
questions for which subsequent ~enerations have
sought answers in the Constitution have been the
questions of those generations. Since those questions
were, most often, not the ones the framers had
specifically addressed, it is not surprising that answers were not to be found in the framers' specific
intentions. Even the most prophetic of the men who
drafted and ratified the Constitution had no occasion
to speculate concerning the role of the federal government, vis-a-vis the states, in the management of an
integrated and industrialized national economy. Nor
did the men of a later generation, who imposed on
each state the obligation to afford every person "the
equal protection of the laws," have reason to consider
whether those words should be held to prohibit sexbased discrimination at a time when the relations
between the sexes would be far different from those
they had known or could have imagined. Although
these and myriad other issues not anticipated by the
framers have over the years pressed for solution, the
notion that the meaning assigned to the Constitution
ought to turn upon the intentions of the framers has
continued to exert a strong attraction. The effort to
resolve that dilemma has led to an appreciation that
the concept of "intention" is a good deal more
ambiguous than the statements of Chief Justice
Taney and Justice Black suggest.
The intentions of the framers can, for example, be
described on different levels of generality. On one
level, it is entirely accurate to state that the framers
intended to allow the death penalty and to deny
Congress the authority to regulate the quantity of
wheat that a farmer might grow for domestic consumption. And the men who adopted the fourteenth
amendment intended to permit legislation that
would bar women from certain occupations or in a
variety of other ways distinguish between men and
women. At the same time, it seems entirely plausible
to understand the framers as having intended to
prohibit all "cruel and unusual punishments," not
merely specific practices with which they were familiar and to which they objected. Similarly, in authorizing Congress to "regulate commerce . . . among the
several states," the framers can appropriately be
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understood as intending to invest it with power to
regulate not only specific activities that they knew
affected that commerce but any activity that might
do so. So also, the guarantee of "equal protection of
the laws" can be understood as proscribing not only
certain practices directed against blacks, with which
the draftsmen were immediately concerned, but also
all other practices that arbitrarily distinguish among
classes of individuals. To ask, in each instance,
whether the framers "intended" the specific or the
general is to pose a question that almost invariably is
unanswerable. The question assumes that they intended one or the other, but not both. But the issues
did not arise for the framers in a way that forced such
a choice: they could have intended both simultaneously because, viewing them as compatible, they
had no reason to choose between them.
The insight that intentions can be understood in
general terms has played an important role in the
development of constitutional law, for it has provided
a means by which to mediate between the belief that
the meaning of the Constitution ought to be found in
the intentions of the framers and the need to
accommodate the Constitution to changing circumstances and values. Armed with the awareness that
the "intentions of the framers" need not be understood to denote only their most particular intentions,
and that the "important objects" of the Constitution
could not be achieved if its meaning were held to be
confined to such intentions, courts have generally
looked to those "important objects" in interpreting
the Constitution, secure in the belief that in doing so
they were still construing the Constitution, not
creating it. Congressional regulation of agriculture,
the virtual abolition of capital punishment, and
significant restriction of governmental power to discriminate on the basis of sex may not have been
specifically intended by the framers, but each might
be thought to have roots in their larger purposes.
The belief that those larger purposes could serve
as a touchstone for constitutional interpretation has,
of course, been especially important because constitutional development has occurred so largely through
the institution of judicial review. The conventional
understanding of the courts' warrant for the power
they exercise is not that the values of judges are
preferable to those of legislators, or that judges are a
better barometer of contemporary societal values
than legislators, but that the values embodied in the
Constitution-the "important objects" of those who
framed the document-are best entrusted to their
care. It has long been accepted, of course, that the
performance of this function requires the appraisal of
new circumstances and, hence, additional value
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choices. But these additional value choices have been
viewed as subsidiary to those written into the Constitution by the framers and, therefore, as susceptible to
evaluation on the basis of their tendency to serve the
larger purposes to which the framers committed the
nation. Constitutional theory and the institution of
judicial review have thus been seen as mutually
supportive: judicial review is necessary to assure
fidelity to the intentions of the framers, and it is
justifiable, notwithstanding its unrepresentative
character, because the values to which courts give
expression are those to which the nation is bound by
the Constitution.
A representative statement of this view of the
Constitution and of the judicial role is contained in a
much-noted article by Judge J. Skelly Wright arguing
that courts should play an active role in enforcing the
Constitution against the other agencies of government. In developing that thesis, Judge Wright rejects
the "axiom ... that a constitutional value choice is
the functional equivalent of an ordinary policy decision." "Constitutional choices," he asserts, "are in
fact different from ordinary decisions. The reason is
simple: the most important value choices have already been made by the framers of the Constitution."
Judge Wright is not Justice Roberts, however. He
recognizes that the answers to constitutional questions cannot be determined simply by laying "the
article of the Constitution which is invoked beside
the statute which is challenged," and that value
choices remain to be made in determining the
application of the Constitution to contemporary
problems. Still, Judge Wright argues, the "broad,
majestic language" of the Constitution was intended
"to guarantee a general sort of relation between the
government and its citizens."
[T]hose outlines provide significant and
sufficient guidance; the [additional] value
choices [now required] are to be made only
within the parameters of the most important
value choices embedded in the constitutional
language. No matter how imprecise in application to specific modern fact situations, the
constitutional guarantees do provide a direction, a goal, an ideal citizen-government relationship. They rule out many alternative directions, goals, and ideals.
The view that constitutional interpretation involves primarily an elucidation of the general intentions of the framers is understandably attractive,
perhaps not only because it seems to support the
institutional arrangements we have established for
giving contemporary meaning to the Constitution,
but also because it is so comforting. The uneasiness,

9

often the agony, and always the responsibility that
accompany a difficult choice are softened by the
belief that real choice does not exist. In law, the
search for repose leads us to attribute responsibility
for decisions to those who have gone before and, in
constitutional law, to wise men we call "the framers."
They may not have foreseen the world in which we
live nor the problems we now face, but the words they
wrote nonetheless provide "sufficient guidance" if
only we have the wisdom to understand them properly. And so the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer
and the libertarianism of John Stuart Mill, though
not in the minds of those who wrote the Constitution,
have at different times each been found there by men
who, no doubt sincerely, believed that the "broad,
majestic language" of the Constitution was intended
to guarantee that "general sort of relationship between the government and its citizens." Nor does it
pass belief that one day soon (perhaps its dawn has
already broken) the egalitarianism of John Rawls
will also be found there.
The "ideal citizen-government relationship" that
Judge Wright finds "embedded in the constitutional
language" is not, of course, the relationship that
Justices Field and Brewer found in the identical
language three quarters of a century earlier, but
rather the relationship defined in the decisions of the
Warren Court, "the one institution ... that seemed to
be speaking most consistently the language of idealism that we all recited in grade school." It would be
nearer the truth to say that the work of the Warren
Court, as that of the Court in the days of Field and
Brewer, demonstrates that the substance of constitutional law, as of common law, "at any given time
pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what
is then understood to be convenient." In some
measure, no doubt, what is "understood to be convenient" depends upon the past. Constitutional values
are not born of the moment; they have a history that
must be understood if they are to be realized. Our
circumstances are perceived in part through the lens
of earlier v{lluations and our aspirations are in part
shaped by them. UltiJI1ately, nevertheless, the values
to which constitutional law gives expression are more
nearly those of the present than those of the past.
To see that that is so, one need only imagine a
stranger to the United States who procures a copy of
the Constitution in order to gain an understanding of
the relationship it establishes between individuals
and government. His first discovery is that government in the United States is not unitary; there are
both state governments and a national government.
Careful examination of the document reveals, moreover, that there are substantially different restric-
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tions upon the exercise of state and national power
over individuals. Neither government, to be sure,
may pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law;
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; or deny citizens the right to vote
on grounds of race, sex, or age (if they are eighteen
years of age or older). These are the only similarities,
however, and there are many differences. The states,
but not the national government, are prohibited from
impairing the obligation of contracts and denying to
any person the equal protection of Jhe laws. On the
other hand, the federal government, but not the
states, is subject to a Bill of Rights, the many
provisions of which are too familiar to require
specification. In addition, neither the federal government nor the states may deny citizens the right to
vote in federal elections because of a failure to pay
any tax, but there is no similar restriction concerning
state elections.
The stranger, were he unfamiliar with our history,
might well puzzle over the reason for such different
limitations on national and state power, but he could
hardly doubt that in the United States the relationship between government and individuals, so far as it
is embodied in fundamental law, largely depends
upon whether the government involved is that of the
nation or of a state. He would, of course, be quite
wrong. With at most a few exceptions, the constitutional rights of individuals against state and national
governments are now the same. The few restrictions
that the contracts clause imposes upon state power
appear to be equally applicable to the national
government through the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. Restrictions on state power under
the equal protection clause also apply equally to the
national government, again through the due process
clause. Nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been extended to the states, once more
through the ubiquitous "due process" clause (though
now of the fourteenth amendment), and have been
held to impose identical restrictions on state and
national power. And, finally, citizens may not, in
state elections any more than in federal elections, be
denied the right to vote because of a failure to pay a
tax. To deprive them of the vote for that reason would
deny them "the equal protection of the laws."
How are we to account for these differences
between the historical document and contemporary
constitutional law? To suggest that the latter is
merely the application to modem life of an "ideal
citizen-government relationship" contemplated by
the framers is to ignore the evidence of the very
document that supposedly expresses that ideal.
Whatever ideals were in the minds of those who

drafted and ratified the original Constitution and its
several amendments (and it is a rather heroic assumption that those ideals were constant over time
or even that the same ideals actuated all those who at
any one time combined in support of a constitutional
proposal), it seems plain enough that the ideals did
not embrace the need for nearly identical restrictions
upon state and national power over individuals. The
imposition of a unitary set of restrictions on state
and national power was the work of a later day. It is
not merely coincidence that this development has
occurred almost entirely over the last fifty years, a
period during which federalist values have been
subject to increasing pressure from the centralizing
tendencies of modern life. Both the reality of American government and the way it is perceived have
changed during these years. Increased mobility and
the growth of mass communication have more and
more led us to see ourselves as one nation and,
together with a rising egalitarianism, have led to a
reduced willingness to treat each state as a separate
political community. The "layer cake" model of
federal-state relations-by which government is divided into separate levels, each operating within a
separate sphere-has been replaced by that of the
"marble cake" -which emphasizes federal-state cooperation and shared responsibility over nearly the
entire range of governmental programs. Although
perhaps not inevitable, it is at least not surprising
that in these circumstances constitutional law
should come to reflect the idea that in their relations
with government, at any level, all Americans, wherever located, are entitled to those protections that we as
a people hold to be fundamental. That idea may or
may not be a desirable one for our times-I do not
want to argue the point here-but it does describe
contemporary constitutional law and it was not
bequeathed to us by "the framers," except as they set
us on the path by which we might find our way to it
and to other principles that seem appropriate in the
light of our current circumstances and aspirations.
The establishment of nearly identical constitutional limitations on state and national power marks
a significant departure from the historical document,
but it represents only a fraction of the distance we
have traveled in shaping constitutional law to our
present values. The meaning of the various limitations on governmental power has changed no less
dramatically then their applicability. The members
of the First Congress, together with the state legislatures, wrote that in "all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense," intending to assure that a defendant's
right to retain counsel would be inviolate. A century
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and a half later the Supreme Court held that this
language in the sixth amendment also conferred a
right to the appointment of counsel if the accused
was indigent. In the wake of the Civil War, the
victors sought to guarantee blacks the rights of
citizenship-and perhaps more broadly to create a
basis for federal citizenship clearly independent of
state citizenship-by including in the Constitution
the provision that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." There is no evidence that
this language was thought to limit whatever power
Congress might have to provide for expatriation. Yet,
in 1967, after a decade of struggle to find a plausible
basis for limiting congressional power, the Court held
that the quoted language denied Congress all power
to deprive a person of citizenship unless it was
voluntarily relinquished.
A comprehensive study of the origins of the first
amendment provision that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press" -language which to contemporary ears sounds
clear and all-embracing-concludes that those who
drafted and ratified the amendment had a far more
- restrictive understanding of its meaning. Undoubtedly, it meant (to them) that Congress could impose no
prior restraints, no system of licensing such as
Milton had inveighed against in Areopagitica. Perhaps they also understood that it would establish
truth as an absolute defense in prosecutions for
seditious libel and that it would confer a right to have
a jury determine both law and fact in such cases.
Conceivably, though the scholar who has most closely examined the question concludes otherwise, they
thought it would ban all federal prosecutions for
seditious libel. However broadly one views the meaning they attributed to that language, it seems plain
enough that they did not anticipate the breadth of
the protection that contemporary constitutional law
affords freedom of expression-protection so extensive as to defy brief description. It is scarcely to be
imagined, for example, that the framers of the first
amendment contemplated the constitutionalization
of the law of libel that has occurred during the past
two decades or the broad protection now enjoyed by
sexually explicit material.
The departures from the historical document in
shaping constitutional law to current perceptions of
need are not restricted to instances in which constitutional provisions have been broadened beyond the
understanding of the framers. At times the Court has
narrowed the original meaning to accommodate the
Constitution to those perceptions. Thus, among the
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sources of the discontent that-led to the convention of
1787, few were more important than the "ignoble
array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors
and the invasion of contractual obligations" adopted
during the 1780s. The importance of that experience
in shaping the Constitution can hardly be overstated,
for it called into question, as Madison wrote in 1787,
"the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such governments are the safest Guardians both of public Good
and private rights." When the members of the
convention prohibited the states from "impairing the
obligation of contracts," therefore, it seems clear that
they did so, as Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a
century and a half later in Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, "with the specific and studied purpose of preventing legislation designed to
relieve debtors especially in time of financial distress." Justice Sutherland, however, wrote in dissent.
A majority of the Court sustained Minnesota's
Mortgage Moratorium Law notwithstanding the clarity of the framers' intentions because "full recognition of the occasion and general purpose of the clause
does not suffice to fix its precise scope." The "scope
of the constitutional prohibition" is to be determined, rather, by examining "the course of judicial
decisions in its application," decisions demonstrating "that there has been a growing appreciation of
public needs and of the necessity of finding ground
for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare."
Now it is true that all the decisions shaping
constitutional law to contemporary values can also
be understood as coming within the general intentions of the framers. All that is necessary is to state
those intentions at a sufficiently high level of abstraction. The framers may not specifically have
intended that the first amendment would restrict
private actions for libel, but they believed "that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American
government .... Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed
silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form." An unrestricted right of action for libel
would trench upon that purpose; hence, the Constitution must-in furtherance of the framers' intent-be
read as restricting the permissible scope of libel
actions. "Bill of attainder" may have carried a
precise meaning for the framers, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter once argued; yet, the Supreme Court has
said, "the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not
as a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be
outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an implementa-
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tion of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or
more simply-trial by legislature." Implementation
of that purpose, the Supreme Court held, required
invalidation of legislation prohibiting members of
the Communist Party from serving as officers or
employees of labor unions-legislation which, whatever its unwisdom, no member of the Philadelphia
convention or of the state ratifying conventions
would have recognized as a bill of attainder. Even a
decision sustaining Minnesota's Mortgage Moratorium Law might find support in the framers' larger
purposes, for as Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the
Court: "The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are
worth while-a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of
society." There is, accordingly, "no warrant for the
conclusion ... that the founders of our Government
would have interpreted the clause differently" than
the Court has over the years. "The vast body of law
which has been developed [over the years] was
unknown to the fathers, but it is believed to have
preserved the essential content and the spirit of the
Constitution."
Reference to the "important objects" of the framers rather than their specific intentions is, no doubt,
a necessity if the evolving needs of the nation are to
be served. The amendment process established by
article V simply will not sustain the entire burden of
adaptation that must be borne if the Constitution is
to remain a vital instrument of government. Yet, it
must be recognized that the more general the statement of the framers' intentions, the weaker is the
claim that those intentions circumscribe present
judgment. To begin with, our understanding of the
framers' intentions is necessarily distorted if we
focus solely upon their larger purposes, ignoring the
particular judgments they made in expressing those
purposes. Intentions do not exist in the abstract; they
are forged in response to particular circumstances
and in the collision of multiple purposes which
impose bounds upon one another. "[T]o make a
general principle worth anything," as Holmes wrote,
you must give it a body; you must show in what
way and how far it would be applied actually in
an actual system; you must show how it has
gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of
concrete instances .... Finally, you must show
its historic relations to other principles, often
of very different date and origin, and thus set it
in the perspective without which its proportions will never truly be judged.

So, too, in understanding the intentions of the
framers. By wrenching the framers' "larger purposes"
from the particular judgments that revealed them, we
incur a loss of perspective, a perspective that might
better enable us to see that the particular judgments
they made were not imperfect expressions of a larger
purpose but a particular accommodation of competing purposes. In freeing ourselves from those judgments we are not serving larger ends determined by
the framers but making room for the introduction of
contemporary values.
The "assistance of counsel" was indeed viewed by
the framers as an important constituent of fair trial,
one of "the essential barriers against arbitrary or
unjust deprivation of human rights." But their
intention to safeguard the right to such assistance in
all federal criminal trials was shaped in part by a
conception of the relationship between government
and its citizens, a conception that did not emphasize-that barely recognized-an affirmative responsibility on the part of government to its citizens.
Absent a sense of such responsibility, it is not
surprising that a trial might be deemed fair so long as
the defendant was not prohibited from retaining
counsel to assist him. Decisions during the past
several decades establishing the right of indigents
accused of crime to appointed counsel do not merely
promote the framers' purpose to achieve fair trials.
They also express a fundamentally altered conception of governmental responsibility and, accordingly,
of what constitutes a fair trial. Virtually all Americans accept the balance thus struck between the
interests of government and of indigent defendants
as both wise and humane, but it is a balance that
reflects the values of contemporary America, not
those of the framers.
Contemporary constitutional law defining freedom of speech and-of the press, similarly, is not
simply a more adequate expression of the purpose of
the framers than they themselves achieved-purposes somehow disembodied from the specific protections they understood to be within the compass of the
first amendment-but a fundamentally different
accommodation of the interests affected by principles
governing the exercise of governmental power. Public
discussion was, to be sure, greatly prized during the
constitutional period both as a "natural right" of free
men and as essential to democratic government. The
literature of the period is filled with statements of its
importance. So great is the allure of these expressions that we are apt to forget how different those
times were from our own. The framers, we need to
remember, had not read John Stuart Mill. They had
not experienced, and thus had no reason to address,
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the needs of a nation as pluralistic as the United
States was later to become. The political order, both
of their own time and of the earlier years in which the
ideal of freedom of expression first emerged, was far
more fragile than that which has existed in the
United States at any time during the twentieth
century. To reason solely from their statements
concerning the importance of public discussion is to
ignore the fact that because of their circumstances
and their history they held competing values-stability of government, security of private reputations, a
conception of sexual morality, etc.-that also played
a role in shaping their understanding of freedom of
speech and of the press. We ought not to suppose
that because these competing values were less frequently given eloquent expression they were entirely
subordinated to public discussiol!.. The competing
,values were already deeply imbedded in the law. The
struggle was to gain recognition of the importance of
public discussion. The best evidence of the balance
that was struck is not the rhetoric that was employed, but the specific principles by which freedom
of speech and the press were understood. When we
ignore those principles, stressing in!,ltead the importance that the framers attached to public discussion
and deemphasizing competing values that carried
more weight for them than for us, the purposes we
serve are not those of the framers, but our own.
The growth of federal power under the commerce
clause may serve as a final illustration of the way in
which reliance upon the general intentions of the
framers permits the values of the present to dominate
those of the past. It is customary to attribute to the
framers the purpose of authorizing Congress to
regulate "that commerce which concerns more states
than one." In the decentralized, rural economy of the
late eighteenth century, that was a relatively limited
grant of authority. A considerable volume of economic activity was not within the market economy; much,
very likely most, activity that was part of the market
economy occurred within the boundaries of a single
state and had no discernible consequences outside
that state. In these circumstances, the power conferred upon Congress afforded relatively limited
opportunity to regulate private activity, and it offered
little threat to the retention of very considerable
autonomy in the states. Congressional power to
regulate "that commerce which concerns more states
than one," in the setting of an integrated, industrialized, modem economy strikes a very different balance
between that power and the autonomy of states and
'individuals. Since all commercial activity may have
consequences outside the state in which it occurs, the
Congress has complete power to displace state gov-
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ernment as a source of economic policy. The expansion of the market sector of the economy further
extends federal power to displace state authority.
Both changes in the economic structure, moreover,
subject an ever-increasing proportion of life to federal
regulatory authority. Lifting the framers' "intentions" out of the context in which they were formed,
and employing them to deal with current issues, thus
yields consequences very different from those the
framers conceivably could have anticipated, and
involves an accommodation of competing values that
cannot reasonably be attributed to them. The framers did intend to authorize Congress to regulate "that
commerce which concerns more states than one," but
to separate that intention from their understanding
that states and individuals retained substantial
autonomy from federal control in the realm of
economic activity is to lose "the perspective without
which its proportions will never truly be judged."
When the framers' intentions are placed in perspective, it is apparent that attribution of the contemporary law of the commerce clause to them is chimerical.
The correspondence between those intentions and
contemporary law would not. be increased, of course,
if the latter were rewritten to reduce federal power
substantially, for that would merely frustrate the
framers' intention that Congress have authority to
regulate "that commerce which concerns more states
than one." The difficulty, obviously, is that in a
modem economy we cannot confer that authority
upon Congress and simultaneously allow a large
measure of individual and state autonomy. Objectives that were compatible in the latter years of the
eighteenth century have ceased to be so during the
twentieth. Contemporary constitutional law, in establishing a new order among these objectives, does
not reflect the intentions of the framers but a
contemporary choice as to how those objectives ought
to be ordered.
The law we ascribe to the Constitution is not, in
brief, a legacy from the "founding fathers" and the
Reconstruction Congress. The "goals" and "ideals"
that Judge Wright sees "embedded in the constitutional language" are those that subsequent generations have found there, which is not quite the same
as saying that they were put there by the framers.
Contemporary constitutional law does, to be sure,
rest upon a conceptual framework and employ a
vocabulary that is in large measure derived from the
framers. The question whether legislation is within
the authority of the federal government must, even
now, be decided within a framework which recognizes
that that government was constituted as one of
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enumerated powers. We do not consider ourselves at
liberty to ignore the question or to answer it merely
by demonstrating that the power can best be exer
cised by the federal government. Decisions continue
to be justified by an analysis which begins with the
proposition that the exercise of power must be
referable to the "commerce" clause or one of the other
heads of federal power. Similarly, legislation is not
beyond the power of government simply because it is
unwise or unjust. A decision limiting governmental
power must be grounded in a limitation of govern
mental power contained in the Constitution.
In making these decisions, however, the past to
which we turn is the sum of our history, not merely
the choices made by those who drafted and ratified
the Constitution. The entirety of that history, togeth
er with current aspirations that are both shaped by it
and shape the meaning derived from it, far more than
the intentions of the framers, determine what each

generation finds in the Constitution. As Holmes put
it in Missouri v. Holland:
when we are dealing with words that are also a
constituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely
by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a century
and cost their successors much sweat and
blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago .... We
must consider what this country has become in
deciding what the Amendment has reserved.

